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The	  historiography	  of	  the	  British	  Liberal	  party	  has	  been	  dominated	  by	  one	  
question:	  why	  did	  it	  decline	  from	  being	  the	  governing	  party	  in	  1914	  into	  
insignificance	  by	  the	  1930s?	  This	  is	  the	  only	  example	  in	  British	  politics	  of	  one	  of	  
the	  two	  main	  parties	  losing	  its	  leading	  role,	  so	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  it	  has	  
generated	  an	  enormous	  literature	  and	  has	  coloured	  virtually	  every	  aspect	  of	  how	  
the	  Liberal	  party,	  and	  the	  Whig	  grouping	  which	  was	  one	  of	  its	  main	  precursors,	  
have	  been	  viewed.	  In	  general,	  long-­‐term	  explanations	  of	  the	  party’s	  fall,	  based	  on	  
changes	  in	  British	  society,	  have	  gradually	  lost	  their	  hold	  and	  the	  party’s	  decline	  is	  
now	  usually	  seen	  as	  an	  unforeseeable	  political	  event,	  precipitated	  by	  the	  party’s	  
divisions	  in	  World	  War	  One.	  But	  more	  recent	  trends	  in	  the	  historiography	  of	  the	  
Liberal	  party	  also	  tend	  to	  discuss	  much	  more	  than	  just	  the	  question	  of	  the	  party’s	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fall	  and	  are	  firmly	  situated	  in	  the	  turn	  towards	  political	  culture	  and	  language	  in	  
studies	  of	  British	  politics.	  This	  essay	  examines	  these	  developments	  and	  suggests	  
some	  future	  directions	  for	  the	  study	  of	  the	  British	  Liberal	  party.	  
	  
	   Recent	  writing	  on	  the	  Whigs	  and	  Liberals	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  has	  
been	  a	  self-­‐conscious	  reaction	  to	  what	  has	  been	  dubbed	  the	  ‘three-­‐stage	  model’	  
of	  British	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  development,	  which	  underlay	  many	  
influential	  analyses	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.1	  In	  this	  scheme	  the	  period	  1790-­‐
1850	  was	  viewed	  as	  one	  of	  exceptional	  turbulence,	  marked	  by	  the	  Industrial	  
Revolution,	  the	  initial	  ‘making’	  of	  both	  middle	  class	  and	  working	  class	  
consciousness	  and	  endemic	  class	  conflict.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  aristocratic	  Whigs	  was	  
merely	  to	  usher	  the	  middle	  class	  into	  the	  pale	  of	  the	  constitution	  with	  the	  1832	  
Reform	  Act	  and	  then	  to	  begin	  a	  long	  slide	  into	  irrelevance	  and	  oblivion;	  the	  
nascent	  Liberal	  party	  being	  seen	  as	  fundamentally	  an	  expression	  of	  middle	  class	  
identity.2	  	  This	  meant	  the	  Liberals	  were	  necessarily	  engaged	  in	  prolonged	  
conflict	  with	  working	  class	  organisations,	  especially	  Chartism.	  The	  period	  1850-­‐
1880	  in	  contrast	  was	  characterised	  as	  one	  of	  rapprochement	  between	  the	  
classes,	  based	  on	  economic	  prosperity	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  elite	  within	  the	  
working	  class,	  the	  ‘labour	  aristocracy’,	  which	  identified	  with	  middle	  class	  
Liberalism.	  This	  situation,	  though,	  was	  superseded	  in	  the	  period	  1880-­‐1920,	  
which	  saw	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  fully-­‐formed	  class	  consciousness	  within	  the	  
working	  class.	  This	  inevitably	  led	  most	  working	  class	  voters	  to	  abandon	  the	  
‘middle	  class’	  Liberals	  for	  the	  new	  Labour	  party,	  while	  the	  Conservatives	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  J.	  Foster,	  Class	  Struggle	  and	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  (London,	  1974);	  R.	  
Harrison,	  Before	  the	  Socialists:	  Studies	  in	  Labour	  and	  Politics	  1861-­‐1881	  (London,	  
2	  D.	  Southgate,	  The	  Passing	  of	  the	  Whigs,	  1832-­‐1886	  (London,	  1962).	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corralled	  the	  frightened	  forces	  of	  property.	  After	  1920	  Labour	  and	  the	  
Conservatives	  faced	  each	  other	  as	  the	  political	  representatives	  of	  the	  middle	  and	  
working	  classes,	  reflecting	  the	  social	  reality	  of	  a	  mature	  capitalist	  system.	  
	   Almost	  every	  aspect	  of	  this	  approach	  has	  now	  been	  challenged.	  Firstly,	  
historians	  have	  substantially	  rethought	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution.3	  Rather	  than	  a	  
single	  dramatic	  take	  off	  into	  industrialisation,	  the	  emphasis	  is	  now	  on	  a	  steady	  
period	  of	  growth	  in	  1700-­‐1820,	  followed	  by	  a	  rather	  faster	  expansion	  in	  1820-­‐
1870.	  There	  is	  no	  necessity	  to	  see	  the	  period	  1790-­‐1850	  as	  witnessing	  sweeping	  
changes	  to	  the	  economy,	  class	  formation	  or	  politics.	  Secondly,	  the	  idea	  that	  
politics	  simply	  reflects	  social	  formations	  has	  now	  been	  discarded	  in	  favour	  of	  
emphasising	  the	  central	  importance	  of	  language	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  politicians	  and	  
activists	  to	  shape	  political	  parties	  and	  their	  fates.4	  Together,	  these	  trends	  have	  
emphasised	  the	  continuities	  rather	  than	  the	  discontinuities	  of	  British	  politics	  
since	  1800.5	  	  
	   All	  of	  these	  general	  developments	  have	  had	  huge	  implications	  for	  how	  the	  
Whigs	  and	  Liberals	  are	  viewed.	  One	  central	  theme	  that	  has	  emerged	  is	  the	  
rehabilitation	  of	  the	  Whigs,	  who	  are	  no	  longer	  seen	  as	  an	  obsolete	  aristocratic	  
clique,	  but	  rather	  as	  the	  first	  modern	  parliamentary	  grouping	  based	  on	  
principles.6	  Their	  social	  status	  certainly	  did	  not	  stop	  them	  successfully	  
participating	  in	  the	  robust	  popular	  culture	  of	  open	  constituencies	  under	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  N.	  Crafts,	  British	  Economic	  Growth	  during	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  (Oxford,	  
1985).	  
4	  J.	  Lawrence,	  Speaking	  for	  the	  People:	  Party,	  Language	  and	  Popular	  Politics	  in	  
England,	  1867-­‐1914	  (Cambridge,	  1998).	  
5	  E.	  Biagini	  and	  A.	  Reid,	  ‘Currents	  of	  Radicalism,	  1850-­‐1914’	  in	  Biagini	  and	  Reid,	  
eds,	  Currents	  of	  Radicalism:	  Popular	  Politics,	  Organised	  Labour	  and	  Party	  Politics	  
in	  Britain,	  1850-­‐1914	  (Cambridge,	  1991),	  pp.	  1-­‐19.	  
6	  F.	  O’Gorman,	  The	  Emergence	  of	  the	  British	  Two-­‐Party	  System,	  1760-­‐1832	  
(London,	  1982).	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unreformed	  electoral	  system,	  cultivating	  the	  press	  or	  taking	  a	  serious	  interest	  in	  
new	  economic	  and	  social	  theories.7	  If	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  any	  need	  to	  see	  them	  as	  
just	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  the	  developing	  middle	  class,	  their	  effectiveness	  as	  
participants	  in	  the	  burgeoning	  public	  sphere	  of	  Georgian	  Britain	  can	  be	  
appreciated.8	  The	  Whigs	  had	  to	  wait	  so	  long	  to	  achieve	  power	  in	  1830,	  not	  
because	  they	  were	  incompetent	  or	  outmoded,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  necessity	  for	  
royal	  approval	  and	  the	  inherent	  advantage	  of	  incumbent	  ministers	  under	  the	  
unreformed	  system.9	  
	   Once	  the	  Whigs	  achieved	  office,	  they	  remained	  the	  central	  component	  of	  
most	  British	  governments	  down	  to	  1886.	  The	  Whig	  governments	  of	  1830-­‐4	  and	  
1835-­‐41	  have	  been	  subjected	  to	  intensive	  study	  and	  their	  members	  classified	  
variously	  as	  ‘Young	  Whigs’,	  ‘Foxites’	  and	  ‘Liberal	  Anglicans’.10	  What	  all	  these	  
studies	  have	  done,	  though	  they	  do	  not	  agree	  in	  detail,	  is	  to	  take	  the	  ideas	  of	  the	  
Whigs	  seriously,	  rather	  than	  viewing	  their	  policies	  merely	  as	  concessions	  wrung	  
from	  a	  reluctant	  aristocracy	  by	  the	  ‘new’	  middle	  class.	  This	  process	  does	  not	  just	  
refer	  to	  the	  1832	  Reform	  Act,	  which	  most	  historians	  now	  see	  as	  an	  embodiment	  
of	  the	  Whig	  ideal	  to	  provide	  disinterested,	  but	  responsive,	  rule	  for	  the	  country’s	  
various	  propertied	  groups,	  rather	  than	  the	  triumph	  of	  the	  ‘middle	  class’.11	  It	  can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  J.	  Parry,	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Liberal	  Government	  in	  Victorian	  Britain	  (New	  
Haven,	  CT,	  1993),	  pp.	  74-­‐5;	  E.A.	  Wasson,	  ‘The	  Whigs	  and	  the	  Press,	  1800-­‐50’,	  
Parliamentary	  History,	  xxv	  (2006),	  68-­‐87;	  I.	  Newbould,	  Whiggery	  and	  Reform,	  
1830-­‐41:	  the	  Politics	  of	  Government	  (Stanford,	  CA,	  1990),	  p.	  105.	  
8	  P.	  Jupp,	  The	  Governing	  of	  Britain,	  1688-­‐1848	  (Abingdon,	  2006),	  pp.	  231-­‐63.	  
9	  P.	  Jupp,	  British	  Politics	  on	  the	  Eve	  of	  Reform:	  the	  Duke	  of	  Wellington’s	  
Administration,	  1828-­‐30	  (Basingstoke,	  1998).	  
10	  R.	  Brent,	  Liberal	  Anglican	  Politics.	  Whiggery,	  Religion	  and	  Reform,	  1830-­‐1841	  
(Oxford,	  1987);	  P.	  Mandler,	  Aristocratic	  Government	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Reform:	  Whigs	  
and	  Liberals	  1830-­‐1852	  (Oxford,	  1990);	  Newbould,	  Whiggery	  and	  Reform.	  
11	  L.	  Mitchell,	  ‘Foxite	  Politics	  and	  the	  Great	  Reform	  Bill’,	  English	  Historical	  Review,	  
cviii	  (1993),	  338-­‐64.	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even	  be	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  the	  Whigs	  who	  helped	  bring	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  
‘middle	  class’	  into	  everyday	  use,	  partly	  by	  arguing	  they	  were	  enfranchising	  this	  
group	  in	  1832.12	  Parry	  has	  gone	  furthest	  in	  outlining	  a	  coherent	  set	  of	  themes	  
and	  ideas	  that	  underlay	  the	  Whig	  approach	  to	  politics	  from	  the	  1830s	  to	  the	  
1880s	  –	  including	  a	  commitment	  to	  govern	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  the	  nations	  of	  
the	  United	  Kingdom,	  responsiveness	  to	  popular	  grievances,	  a	  belief	  in	  the	  
harmony	  of	  social	  groups	  and	  undogmatic	  Christianity	  (rather	  than	  narrow	  
Anglicanism)	  and	  a	  specific	  version	  of	  patriotism,	  which	  viewed	  Britain	  as	  
leading	  Europe	  in	  the	  paths	  of	  liberty,	  constitutional	  government	  and	  
humanitarianism.13	  Works	  like	  Parry’s	  have	  raised	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  leading	  
Whigs,	  especially	  Lord	  John	  Russell	  and	  Palmerston,	  and	  filled	  out	  the	  picture	  of	  
how	  the	  Whigs	  connected	  with	  British	  society.14	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  rapprochement	  
between	  Whigs	  and	  middle	  class	  Liberals	  in	  the	  1850s	  has	  not	  entirely	  
disappeared,	  but	  it	  has	  been	  reconfigured.	  If	  the	  Whigs	  accepted,	  in	  1845,	  the	  
need	  to	  repeal	  the	  Corn	  Laws	  and	  a	  minimal,	  low-­‐tax	  central	  government,	  rather	  
than	  their	  more	  interventionist	  policies	  of	  the	  1830s,	  this	  was	  a	  shift	  that	  left	  the	  
Whigs,	  especially	  under	  Palmerston,	  more	  firmly	  ensconced	  in	  national	  power	  
than	  ever,	  nor	  were	  these	  developments	  purely	  a	  response	  to	  external	  
pressure.15	  The	  formation	  of	  ‘middle	  class’	  consciousness	  remains	  much-­‐
debated,	  but	  historians	  increasingly	  view	  this	  group	  as	  deeply	  divided	  by	  religion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  D.	  Wahrman,	  Imagining	  the	  Middle	  Class:	  the	  Political	  Representation	  of	  Class	  in	  
Britain,	  c.	  1780-­‐1840	  (Cambridge,	  1995).	  
13	  Parry,	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Liberal	  Government,	  p.	  4;	  J.	  Parry,	  The	  Politics	  of	  
Patriotism:	  English	  Liberalism,	  National	  Identity	  and	  Europe,	  1830-­‐1886	  
(Cambridge,	  2006).	  
14	  E.	  Steele,	  Palmerston	  and	  Liberalism,	  1855-­‐1865	  (Cambridge,	  1991).	  
15	  Parry,	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Liberal	  Government,	  pp.	  155-­‐217.	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and	  politics,	  as	  well	  as	  occupation	  and	  wealth,	  with	  many	  of	  its	  constituent	  parts	  
focused	  on	  exercising	  authority	  in	  the	  local	  arena,	  rather	  than	  national	  affairs.16	  
	   This	  analysis	  dovetails	  with	  increasing	  doubts	  about	  the	  achievements	  of	  
those	  MPs	  (often	  from	  a	  middle	  class	  background)	  who	  described	  themselves	  as	  
Radicals	  and	  argued	  for	  more	  far-­‐reaching	  reforms	  in	  the	  constitution,	  taxation	  
and	  administration	  than	  the	  Whigs	  were	  prepared	  to	  undertake.	  For	  instance,	  
business	  MPs	  often	  just	  did	  not	  agree	  about	  what	  they	  wanted	  to	  achieve	  (e.g.	  on	  
issues	  like	  introducing	  limited	  liability	  for	  companies)	  any	  more	  than	  the	  middle	  
class	  as	  a	  whole	  did.17	  ‘Independent’	  Radicalism	  among	  MPs	  died	  out	  by	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  1850s	  as	  the	  agenda	  of	  reducing	  government	  expenditure	  was	  achieved.18	  
Increasingly,	  historians	  have	  drawn	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which,	  after	  1832,	  
all	  non-­‐Conservative	  MPs	  in	  Great	  Britain	  shared	  a	  common	  identity,	  even	  if	  the	  
name	  ‘Liberal’	  only	  gradually	  came	  into	  common	  use	  in	  1847-­‐1859.19	  This	  did	  
not	  mean	  that	  Liberal	  MPs	  constituted	  a	  party	  in	  the	  contemporary	  sense,	  but	  
most	  self-­‐described	  Radicals	  were	  attached,	  sometimes	  more	  loosely,	  sometimes	  
more	  tightly,	  to	  Whig	  governments	  and	  Salmon	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  
registration	  requirements	  of	  the	  1832	  Reform	  Act	  had	  an	  enormous	  impact	  in	  
stimulating	  party	  organisation	  at	  the	  local	  level.20	  Parry	  places	  the	  foundation	  of	  
the	  parliamentary	  Liberal	  party	  as	  early	  as	  1834,	  though	  others	  continue	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  M.	  Savage,	  J.	  Barlow,	  P.	  Dickens	  and	  T.	  Fielding,	  Property,	  Bureaucracy	  and	  
Culture:	  Middle	  Class	  Formation	  in	  Contemporary	  Britain	  (London,	  1992),	  pp.	  36-­‐
57;	  S.	  Gunn	  and	  R.	  Bell,	  The	  Middle	  Classes:	  their	  Rise	  and	  Sprawl	  (London,	  2003),	  
pp.	  1-­‐20.	  
17	  G.	  Searle,	  Entrepreneurial	  Politics	  in	  Mid-­‐Victorian	  Britain	  (Oxford,	  1993),	  pp.	  
187-­‐93.	  
18	  M.	  Taylor,	  The	  Decline	  of	  British	  Radicalism,	  1847-­‐1860	  (Oxford,	  1995).	  
19	  J.	  Coohill,	  Ideas	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Party:	  Perceptions,	  Agendas	  and	  Liberal	  Politics	  in	  
the	  House	  of	  Commons,	  1832-­‐52	  (Chichester,	  2011).	  
20	  P.	  Salmon,	  Electoral	  Reform	  at	  Work:	  Local	  Politics	  and	  National	  Parties,	  1832-­‐
1841	  (Woodbridge,	  2002).	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prefer	  the	  traditional	  moment	  of	  the	  meeting	  at	  Willis’s	  Tea	  Rooms	  in	  1859,	  in	  
which	  MPs	  agreed	  to	  bring	  down	  the	  minority	  Conservative	  administration.21	  
Whichever	  of	  these	  two	  parameters	  is	  preferred	  there	  is	  now	  agreement	  that	  
Radicalism	  and	  Whiggery	  were	  a	  spectrum	  of	  opinion	  rather	  than	  polar	  
opposites	  based	  around	  class.	  
	   Popular	  Radicalism’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  Whigs	  was	  much	  more	  
problematic.	  	  Older	  traditions	  of	  interpretation	  saw	  popular	  Radicalism	  as	  
essentially	  an	  expression	  of	  working	  class	  consciousness,	  culminating	  in	  
Chartism.22	  More	  recently,	  Stedman	  Jones’s	  work	  has	  led	  the	  way	  in	  emphasising	  
the	  ways	  in	  which	  popular	  Radicalism	  represented	  a	  plebeian	  tradition	  dating	  
back	  to	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  rather	  than	  a	  new	  form	  of	  class	  consciousness,	  let	  
alone	  class	  conflict.23	  Seen	  in	  this	  light,	  the	  gap	  between	  Chartism	  and	  
parliamentary	  Radicalism	  (and	  even	  Whiggism)	  was	  bridgeable	  in	  some	  
circumstances.	  If	  some	  moments	  (e.g.	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  Charters	  in	  1842	  
and	  1848)	  seemed	  to	  drive	  the	  movements	  apart	  there	  were	  consistent	  efforts	  to	  
bring	  them	  together	  over	  a	  programme	  of	  franchise	  and	  financial	  reform	  and,	  as	  
Chase	  has	  pointed	  out,	  Chartism	  was	  not	  hostile	  to	  all	  parliamentary	  activity.24	  In	  
this	  interpretation	  it	  was	  logical	  that	  many	  ex-­‐Chartists	  should	  move	  into	  
Liberalism	  in	  the	  1850s	  and	  1860s,	  as	  it	  seemed	  to	  offer	  hope	  of	  progress	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Parry,	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Liberal	  Government,	  p.	  108;	  A.	  Hawkins,	  Victorian	  
Political	  Culture:	  ‘Habits	  of	  Heart	  &	  Mind’	  (Oxford,	  2015),	  pp.	  103-­‐04.	  
22	  E.P.	  Thompson,	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  English	  Working	  Class	  (London,	  1963).	  
23	  G.	  Stedman	  Jones,	  ‘Rethinking	  Chartism’,	  in	  Stedman	  Jones,	  Languages	  of	  Class:	  
Studies	  in	  English	  Working	  Class	  History	  1832-­‐1982	  (Cambridge,	  1983),	  pp.	  90-­‐
178.	  
24	  M.	  Turner,	  ‘Thomas	  Perronet	  Thompson,	  “sensible	  Chartism”	  and	  the	  Chimera	  
of	  Radical	  Unity’,	  Albion,	  xxx	  (2001),	  51-­‐74;	  C.	  Skelly,	  Moral	  Force	  Chartism:	  its	  
Origins,	  Nature	  and	  Development,	  1836-­‐1850	  (Saarbrucken,	  2013);	  M.	  Chase,	  
‘”Labour’s	  Candidates”:	  Chartist	  Challenges	  at	  the	  Parliamentary	  Polls,	  1839-­‐60’,	  
Labour	  History	  Review,	  lxxiv	  (2009),	  64-­‐89.	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extending	  the	  right	  to	  vote,	  restricting	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Church	  of	  England,	  Free	  
Trade	  and	  reduced	  indirect	  taxation.	  To	  historians	  like	  Biagini,	  this	  was	  an	  
entirely	  rational	  strategy	  on	  matters	  that	  affected	  working	  class	  activists	  and	  the	  
most	  obvious	  way	  to	  promote	  the	  traditional	  concerns	  of	  plebeian	  Radicalism	  
both	  before	  and	  during	  Chartism.25	  	  It	  did	  not	  require	  any	  explanation	  through	  
elaborate	  theorisations	  about	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  strata	  of	  the	  working	  class.	  
Indeed,	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  mid-­‐Victorian	  labour	  aristocracy	  as	  the	  driver	  of	  
working	  class	  Liberalism	  has	  taken	  some	  hammer	  blows	  recently	  and	  most	  
historians	  doubt	  such	  a	  group	  was	  a	  new	  development	  in	  this	  period,	  or	  that	  it	  
held	  moderate	  political	  views	  based	  on	  its	  role	  in	  the	  economy.26	  	  Biagini’s	  
analysis,	  like	  that	  of	  Stedman	  Jones,	  centres	  on	  long-­‐term	  continuity	  in	  popular	  
ideas	  and	  language,	  but	  Joyce	  has	  taken	  linguistic	  analysis	  further,	  denying	  any	  
class	  element	  at	  all	  in	  the	  world	  view	  of	  Radical	  working	  men,	  who	  he	  suggests	  
saw	  themselves	  as	  part	  of	  ‘the	  people’	  or	  even	  ‘humanity’.27	  This	  view	  has	  
provoked	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  criticism,	  not	  only	  from	  those	  who	  have	  pointed	  out	  the	  
coded	  nature	  of	  class	  references	  in	  the	  symbols	  and	  practices	  of	  popular	  
Radicalism,	  but	  from	  historians	  who	  have	  emphasised	  the	  continued	  tensions	  
between	  Liberals	  and	  Radicals	  (often	  with	  a	  background	  in	  Chartism	  or	  Trades	  
Unionism,	  however	  they	  defined	  their	  class	  position	  to	  themselves).28	  Rival	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  E.	  Biagini,	  Liberty,	  Retrenchment	  and	  Reform:	  Popular	  Liberalism	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  
Gladstone,	  1860-­‐1880	  (Cambridge,	  1992),	  pp.	  8-­‐16.	  
26	  R.	  Gray,	  The	  Labour	  Aristocracy	  in	  Victorian	  Edinburgh	  (Oxford,	  1976);	  G.	  
Crossick,	  An	  Artisan	  Elite	  in	  Victorian	  Society:	  Kentish	  London,	  1840-­‐1880	  
(London,	  1978).	  
27	  P.	  Joyce,	  Visions	  of	  the	  People:	  Industrial	  England	  and	  the	  Question	  of	  Class,	  
1848-­‐1914	  (Cambridge,	  1991).	  
28	  J.	  Epstein,	  Radical	  Expression:	  Political	  Language,	  Ritual	  and	  Symbol	  in	  England,	  
1790-­‐1850	  (Oxford,	  1994);	  A.	  Taylor,	  ‘”The	  Glamour	  of	  Independence”:	  By-­‐
elections	  and	  Radicalism	  during	  the	  Liberal	  Meridian,	  1869-­‐83’	  in	  T.	  Otte	  and	  P.	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candidatures	  within	  the	  Liberal	  party	  were	  a	  regular	  feature	  of	  elections	  up	  to	  
1885	  and	  arguably	  only	  declined	  with	  the	  radicalisation	  of	  the	  whole	  party	  after	  
1886.	  
	   Liberalism	  remained	  a	  broad	  and	  quarrelsome	  church,	  but	  there	  is	  now	  
much	  agreement	  that	  in	  the	  1850s	  and	  1860s	  it	  was	  marked	  both	  by	  underlying	  
ideological	  continuity	  and	  a	  drawing	  together	  of	  fissiparous	  elements.29	  One	  new	  
feature	  in	  this	  process	  was	  a	  more	  direct	  relationship	  between	  Liberal	  leaders	  
and	  activists	  in	  the	  country.	  This	  was	  initiated	  by	  Palmerston	  in	  the	  1850s,	  but	  
was	  brought	  to	  new	  heights	  by	  Gladstone	  –	  the	  dominant	  figure	  of	  Liberalism	  
from	  the	  1860s	  to	  the	  1890s.30	  His	  populist	  campaigns	  gave	  him	  a	  hitherto	  
unthought-­‐of	  standing.31	  To	  Vincent,	  Gladstone’s	  appeal	  was	  fundamentally	  
irrational	  and	  a	  kind	  of	  substitute	  for	  practical	  policies;	  but	  to	  Biagini	  this	  merely	  
symbolised	  his	  modernity	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  charismatic	  leader	  who	  was	  required	  to	  
ignite	  the	  enthusiasm	  of	  voters	  –	  but	  one	  who	  was	  careful	  to	  retain	  and	  embody	  
the	  appeal	  to	  popular	  Radicalism	  that	  had	  made	  his	  followers	  Liberals	  in	  the	  first	  
place.32	  	  
	   Gladstone’s	  leadership	  provided	  a	  triumphant	  culmination	  for	  mid-­‐
Victorian	  Liberalism	  and	  a	  symbol	  of	  Liberals’	  ability	  to	  function	  successfully	  in	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Readman,	  eds,	  By-­‐elections	  in	  British	  Politics,	  1832-­‐1914	  (Woodbridge,	  2013),	  pp.	  
99-­‐120.	  	  
29	  J.	  Vincent,	  The	  Formation	  of	  the	  British	  Liberal	  Party,	  1857-­‐1868	  (2nd	  edn,	  
Hassocks,	  1976)	  and	  M.	  Finn,	  After	  Chartism:	  Class	  and	  Nation	  in	  English	  Radical	  
Politics,	  1848-­‐1874	  (Cambridge,	  1993),	  in	  contrast	  to	  D.A.	  Hamer,	  Politics	  of	  
Electoral	  Pressure:	  a	  Study	  in	  the	  History	  of	  Victorian	  Reform	  Agitations	  
(Hassocks,	  1977).	  
30	  H.C.G.	  Matthew,	  Gladstone	  (2	  vols,	  Oxford,	  1986-­‐1996);	  R.	  Shannon,	  Gladstone	  
(2	  vols,	  London,	  1982-­‐1999).	  
31	  A.	  Saab,	  Reluctant	  Icon.	  Gladstone,	  Bulgaria	  and	  the	  Working	  Classes,	  1856-­‐1878	  
(Cambridge,	  MA,	  1991);	  Biagini,	  Liberty,	  Retrenchment	  and	  Reform,	  pp.	  369-­‐425.	  
32	  Vincent,	  Formation	  of	  the	  British	  Liberal	  Party,	  pp.	  211-­‐35;	  E.	  Biagini,	  Gladstone	  
(Basingstoke,	  2000),	  pp.	  57-­‐74.	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system	  with	  a	  mass	  electorate	  -­‐	  the	  Conservatives	  (with	  support	  from	  Radical	  
Liberals)	  had	  extended	  the	  vote	  to	  all	  male	  householders	  in	  the	  boroughs	  in	  1867	  
and	  the	  Liberals	  applied	  this	  system	  to	  county	  seats	  in	  1884,	  ensuring	  over	  three	  
quarters	  of	  the	  electorate	  was	  working	  class.33	  However,	  the	  1880s	  have	  usually	  
been	  interpreted	  as	  a	  decade	  of	  crisis	  and	  decline	  for	  the	  Liberal	  party.	  This	  is	  
firstly	  because	  of	  the	  dominant	  event	  in	  Gladstone’s	  later	  career	  –	  his	  decision	  to	  
embrace	  Irish	  Home	  Rule	  in	  1885	  and	  the	  resultant	  split	  in	  the	  Liberal	  party	  in	  
1886,	  with	  a	  substantial	  group	  of	  opponents	  of	  this	  policy	  decamping	  to	  a	  
separate	  Liberal	  Unionist	  party,	  in	  alliance	  with	  the	  Conservatives.34	  Gladstone’s	  
motivations	  for	  this	  dramatic	  volte-­‐face	  have	  been	  much-­‐debated,	  though	  
explanations	  that	  emphasise	  his	  Machiavellian	  attempts	  to	  gain	  office	  through	  
alliance	  with	  the	  Irish	  Nationalists,	  a	  misguided	  crusade	  to	  unite	  Liberals,	  or	  his	  
determination	  to	  avoid	  any	  commitment	  to	  social	  reform	  have	  now	  been	  
overshadowed	  by	  interpretations	  which	  emphasise	  Gladstone	  came	  to	  his	  
decision	  gradually	  after	  an	  intensive	  course	  of	  reading	  and	  reflection.35	  For	  
Gladstone,	  Home	  Rule	  was	  an	  attempt	  finally	  to	  solve	  the	  ‘Irish	  Question’	  by	  
reconciling	  the	  Nationalist	  movement	  to	  Ireland’s	  continued	  membership	  of	  the	  
United	  Kingdom.	  	  However,	  why	  this	  decision	  split	  the	  Liberal	  party	  has	  
continued	  to	  be	  controversial.	  Older	  interpretations	  saw	  it	  merely	  as	  the	  
occasion	  for	  the	  Whigs	  and	  other	  moderate,	  propertied	  Liberals	  to	  leave	  a	  party	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  R.	  Saunders,	  Democracy	  and	  the	  Vote	  in	  British	  Politics:	  the	  Making	  of	  the	  
Second	  Reform	  Act	  (Aldershot,	  2011);	  A.	  Jones,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Reform	  1884	  
(Cambridge,	  1972);	  D.	  Tanner,	  Political	  Change	  and	  the	  Labour	  Party,	  1900-­‐1918	  
(Cambridge,	  1990),	  pp.	  99-­‐129.	  
34	  I.	  Cawood,	  The	  Liberal	  Unionist	  Party:	  a	  History	  (London,	  2012).	  
35	  A.	  Cooke	  and	  J.	  Vincent,	  The	  Governing	  Passion:	  Cabinet	  Government	  and	  Party	  
Politics	  in	  Britain,	  1885-­‐86	  (Brighton,	  1974);	  D.A.	  Hamer,	  Liberal	  Politics	  in	  the	  
Age	  of	  Gladstone	  and	  Rosebery	  (Oxford,	  1972),	  pp.	  108-­‐23;	  J.	  Loughlin,	  Gladstone,	  
Home	  Rule	  and	  the	  Ulster	  Question,	  1882-­‐93	  (Dublin,	  1986),	  pp.	  180-­‐96,	  286-­‐90.	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they	  feared	  had	  lurched	  to	  the	  left	  under	  Gladstone	  –	  and	  indeed	  most	  of	  the	  
party’s	  great	  landowners,	  as	  well	  as	  some	  of	  its	  leading	  intellectual	  spokesmen	  
and	  some	  prominent	  businessmen	  did	  leave	  it	  in	  1886.36	  
	   However,	  Ireland	  had	  never	  been	  an	  easy	  issue	  for	  Whigs	  and	  Radicals;	  
while	  they	  had	  been	  no	  less	  committed	  to	  the	  Union	  than	  Conservatives,	  many	  
had	  always	  been	  uneasy	  about	  naked	  assertions	  of	  British	  power	  and	  had	  sought	  
to	  conciliate	  Irish	  Catholic	  opinion.	  Gladstone’s	  conversion	  to	  Home	  Rule	  could	  
be	  seen	  as	  one	  possible	  development	  of	  these	  policies.	  However,	  a	  substantial	  
minority	  of	  Liberals	  did	  not	  view	  the	  matter	  in	  this	  light	  and	  saw	  Ireland	  as	  a	  
society	  that	  required	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  liberal	  values	  to	  be	  imposed	  upon	  it	  and	  
Irish	  Nationalism	  as	  a	  fundamentally	  illiberal	  movement.37	  The	  split	  of	  1886	  can	  
therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  ideological	  division	  within	  Liberalism	  about	  Ireland,	  
rather	  than	  a	  proxy	  for	  other	  arguments	  or	  class	  conflicts.38	  This	  can	  in	  turn	  
explain	  why	  some	  Radicals	  as	  well	  as	  moderates	  opposed	  Home	  Rule	  and	  the	  
difficulty	  in	  matching	  up	  the	  social	  background	  of	  Liberal	  MPs	  to	  their	  opinions	  
on	  Ireland	  in	  1886.	  Some	  historians,	  though,	  have	  continued	  to	  emphasise	  the	  
‘high	  political’	  context	  to	  the	  Liberal	  split	  –	  particularly	  in	  explaining	  Gladstone’s	  
refusal	  to	  conciliate	  the	  rebels	  or	  the	  motives	  of	  key	  Liberal	  Unionists	  like	  Joseph	  
Chamberlain.39	  
	   This	  division	  within	  Liberalism	  has	  continued	  to	  be	  linked	  to	  debates	  
about	  the	  party’s	  decline.	  For	  historians	  like	  Parry	  the	  Liberal	  party	  after	  1886	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  G.	  Goodman,	  ‘Liberal	  Unionism:	  the	  Revolt	  of	  the	  Whigs’,	  Victorian	  Studies,	  iii	  
(1959),	  173-­‐89.	  
37	  Parry,	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Liberal	  Government,	  pp.	  292-­‐303.	  
38	  T.	  Jenkins,	  Gladstone,	  Whiggery	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Party,	  1874-­‐86	  (Oxford,	  1988);	  
W.C.	  Lubenow,	  Parliamentary	  Politics	  and	  the	  Home	  Rule	  Crisis:	  the	  British	  House	  
of	  Commons	  in	  1886	  (Oxford,	  1988).	  
39	  Jenkins,	  Gladstone,	  Whiggery	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Party,	  pp.	  230-­‐93.	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was	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  its	  predecessor	  and	  much	  weaker;	  the	  split	  
deprived	  the	  Liberals	  of	  any	  claim	  to	  the	  Whig	  tradition	  of	  disinterested	  
government	  that	  balanced	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  and	  this	  development	  made	  it	  much	  
less	  popular	  (it	  only	  once	  gained	  a	  majority	  after	  1885	  –	  in	  1906).40	  	  This	  was	  
just	  as	  important	  in	  harming	  Liberalism’s	  popularity	  as	  the	  loss	  of	  support	  to	  the	  
Liberal	  Unionists	  in	  areas	  like	  Birmingham	  and	  Glasgow.	  From	  a	  rather	  different	  
perspective,	  Lawrence	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  party’s	  remaining	  Nonconformist	  
supporters	  were	  able	  to	  push	  it	  into	  fundamentally	  unpopular	  positions,	  
especially	  over	  the	  regulation	  of	  working	  class	  behaviour	  on	  drinking,	  gambling	  
and	  sexual	  morality	  and	  this	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  party’s	  electoral	  difficulties.41	  It	  
has	  also	  been	  suggested,	  rather	  less	  convincingly,	  that	  if	  the	  Liberals	  had	  not	  lost	  
Joseph	  Chamberlain	  in	  1886	  they	  could	  have	  taken	  up	  social	  reform	  and	  secured	  
their	  popularity	  with	  working	  class	  voters.42	  What	  all	  these	  arguments	  imply	  is	  
that	  the	  Liberal	  party’s	  problems	  created	  a	  space	  for	  the	  Labour	  party	  to	  emerge	  
on	  the	  Left	  of	  British	  politics.	  	  
But	  in	  many	  long-­‐standing	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Liberals’	  decline	  the	  
party’s	  split	  in	  1886	  was	  only	  incidental.	  The	  1880s	  marked	  a	  crucial	  moment	  in	  
Liberalism’s	  decline,	  not	  because	  of	  events	  in	  parliament,	  but	  because	  of	  
developments	  in	  society	  and	  the	  economy	  that	  ensured	  Liberalism	  lost	  its	  appeal	  
to	  the	  working	  class	  in	  favour	  of	  Labour,	  which	  could	  make	  an	  explicit	  appeal	  to	  
workers’	  growing	  class	  consciousness.	  The	  period	  from	  the	  1880s	  to	  the	  1920s	  
witnessed	  a	  ‘remaking’	  of	  the	  working	  class,	  based	  on	  increased	  conflict	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Parry,	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Liberal	  Government,	  pp.	  306-­‐11.	  
41	  J.	  Lawrence,	  ‘Class	  and	  Gender	  in	  the	  Making	  of	  Urban	  Toryism,	  1880-­‐1914’,	  
English	  Historical	  Review,	  cviii	  (1993),	  629-­‐652.	  
42	  T.A.	  Jenkins,	  The	  Liberal	  Ascendancy,	  1830-­‐1886	  (Basingstoke,	  1994),	  pp.	  217-­‐
18.	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workplace,	  a	  more	  complete	  segregation	  of	  the	  classes,	  as	  working	  class	  suburbs	  
grew	  outside	  city	  centres,	  and	  an	  increasingly	  homogenous	  working	  class	  
culture.	  This	  essentially	  sociological	  argument	  underlay	  much	  of	  the	  case	  for	  the	  
unavoidable	  decline	  of	  Liberalism	  from	  the	  1880s	  onwards,	  buttressed	  by	  
histories	  of	  the	  Labour	  party	  that	  emphasised	  the	  party’s	  growing	  organisation	  
and	  electoral	  appeal	  in	  1900-­‐1914.43	  
	   This	  approach	  is	  now	  very	  much	  on	  the	  wane,	  under	  a	  twin	  assault	  on	  
both	  its	  underpinnings	  and	  its	  empirical	  evidence.	  Historians	  are	  no	  longer	  
willing	  to	  trace	  an	  unproblematic	  increase	  in	  working	  class	  identity	  to	  the	  years	  
between	  the	  1880s	  and	  1914,	  any	  more	  than	  they	  are	  to	  ascribe	  it	  to	  the	  1840s.	  
Instead,	  there	  is	  much	  more	  emphasis	  on	  what	  divided	  members	  of	  the	  working	  
class	  rather	  than	  what	  united	  them;	  even	  at	  the	  most	  basic	  economic	  level,	  
divisions	  between	  ‘skilled’	  and	  ‘unskilled’	  workers,	  or	  between	  workers	  in	  
different	  regions,	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  shrunk	  in	  any	  major	  and	  continued	  
fashion	  in	  1880-­‐1914.44	  As	  increasing	  working	  class	  consciousness	  is	  no	  longer	  
accepted	  as	  a	  given	  aspect	  of	  the	  period	  from	  the	  1880s	  onwards,	  the	  Liberal	  
party’s	  fortunes	  can	  now	  be	  judged	  in	  a	  much	  less	  gloomy	  fashion.	  The	  empirical	  
evidence	  on	  the	  party’s	  electoral	  fortunes,	  for	  instance,	  does	  not	  suggest	  a	  
picture	  of	  decline	  before	  1914.	  After	  the	  doldrums	  of	  the	  1880s	  and	  1890s	  the	  
Liberals	  won	  an	  overall	  majority	  in	  1906,	  retained	  office	  in	  1910	  (twice)	  with	  the	  
help	  of	  their	  Labour	  and	  Irish	  Nationalist	  allies,	  and	  the	  result	  of	  the	  election	  due	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Hobsbawm,	  ‘Making	  of	  the	  Working	  Class’;	  R.	  McKibbin,	  The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  
Labour	  Party,	  1910-­‐1924	  (Oxford,	  1974).	  
44	  R.	  Harrison	  and	  J.	  Zeitlin,	  eds,	  Divisions	  of	  Labour.	  Skilled	  Workers	  and	  
Technological	  Change	  in	  Nineteenth	  Century	  England	  (Brighton,	  1985);	  E.H.	  Hunt,	  
Regional	  Wage	  Variations	  in	  Britain,	  1850-­‐1914	  (Oxford,	  1973);	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in	  1915	  might	  well	  have	  been	  similar.45	  On	  this	  basis,	  the	  Edwardian	  era	  could	  be	  
viewed	  as	  witnessing	  a	  crisis	  of	  Conservatism,	  rather	  than	  Liberalism	  and	  
detailed	  work	  on	  Labour’s	  organisation	  and	  electoral	  performance	  suggests	  it	  
was	  in	  no	  position	  to	  mount	  a	  major	  challenge	  to	  the	  Liberals.46	  	  
	   The	  reasons	  assigned	  for	  the	  Liberals’	  success,	  though,	  have	  started	  to	  
change.	  The	  pioneer	  in	  this	  field	  was	  Clarke.47	  He	  accepted	  that	  voting	  had	  
become	  more	  class-­‐based	  by	  1914	  but	  suggested	  the	  Liberals	  had	  benefited	  from	  
this	  by	  capturing	  the	  working	  class	  electorate	  through	  their	  advocacy	  of	  social	  
reforms,	  particularly	  the	  Old	  Age	  Pensions	  Act	  of	  1908.	  This	  position	  was	  
supported	  by	  Freeden’s	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  advocacy	  of	  social	  reform	  by	  the	  
party’s	  ‘New	  Liberals’.48	  However,	  if	  class-­‐based	  voting	  had	  not	  become	  the	  main	  
feature	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  by	  1914,	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  necessary	  to	  think	  of	  
social	  reform	  as	  the	  only	  reason	  for	  the	  Liberals’	  success	  in	  this	  period.	  
Increasingly,	  historians	  have	  come	  to	  realise	  that	  other	  issues	  that	  had	  once	  been	  
dismissed	  as	  irrelevant	  in	  1900-­‐1914	  were	  quite	  as	  important	  to	  voters	  in	  this	  
period	  as	  social	  reform.	  
	   This	  analysis	  has	  now	  extended	  across	  the	  whole	  spectrum	  of	  Edwardian	  
politics.	  A	  number	  of	  historians	  have	  argued	  persuasively	  that	  Irish	  Home	  Rule	  
continued	  to	  arouse	  strong	  popular	  passions	  around	  issues	  of	  democracy	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  I.	  Packer,	  ‘Contested	  Ground:	  Trends	  in	  British	  By-­‐elections,	  1911-­‐1914’,	  
Contemporary	  British	  History,	  xxv	  (2011),	  157-­‐73.	  
46	  E.H.H.	  Green,	  The	  Crisis	  of	  Conservatism:	  the	  Politics,	  Economics	  and	  Ideology	  of	  
the	  British	  Conservative	  Party,	  1880-­‐1914	  (London,	  1995),	  pp.	  267-­‐306;	  Tanner,	  
Political	  Change	  and	  the	  Labour	  Party.	  
47	  P.	  Clarke,	  Lancashire	  and	  the	  New	  Liberalism	  (Cambridge,	  1971).	  
48	  M.	  Freeden,	  The	  New	  Liberalism:	  an	  Ideology	  of	  Social	  Reform	  (Oxford,	  1978).	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national	  and	  religious	  identity.49	  Free	  Trade	  has	  been	  reconfigured	  as	  less	  a	  
defence	  of	  laissez-­‐faire	  than	  an	  argument	  for	  cheap	  food	  for	  working	  class	  
consumers.50	  Historians	  of	  religion	  have	  increasingly	  postponed	  the	  
secularization	  of	  British	  society	  into	  deep	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  making	  the	  
Edwardian	  obsession	  with	  the	  battle	  between	  the	  Church	  of	  England	  and	  
Nonconformity	  intelligible.51	  Issues	  specific	  to	  Scotland	  and	  Wales,	  including	  the	  
beginnings	  of	  arguments	  for	  self-­‐government,	  now	  seem	  distinctly	  modern.52	  
The	  cause	  of	  land	  reform	  has	  been	  rescued	  from	  oblivion	  as	  a	  key	  component	  of	  
the	  Edwardian	  political	  scene,	  and	  an	  issue	  that	  both	  reflected	  the	  important	  role	  
that	  aristocrats	  still	  played	  in	  politics	  and	  was	  capable	  of	  incorporating	  policies	  
of	  rural	  reconstruction,	  housing	  reform	  and	  minimum	  wages.53	  Finally,	  no	  
historian	  would	  now	  deny	  the	  central	  importance	  of	  women’s	  suffrage	  and	  
women’s	  role	  in	  society	  to	  Edwardian	  politics.54	  	  This	  rehabilitation	  of	  issues	  
other	  than	  social	  reform	  has	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  see	  Liberalism’s	  success	  before	  
1914	  as	  based	  partly	  on	  its	  identification	  with	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  issues	  that	  
reached	  back	  into	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  but	  which	  were	  still	  relevant	  to	  voters.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  E.	  Biagini,	  British	  Democracy	  and	  Irish	  Nationalism,	  1876-­‐1906	  (Cambridge,	  
2007);	  D.	  Jackson,	  Popular	  Opposition	  to	  Irish	  Home	  Rule	  in	  Edwardian	  Britain	  
(Liverpool,	  2009).	  
50	  A.	  Howe,	  Free	  Trade	  and	  Liberal	  England,	  1846-­‐1946	  (Oxford,	  1998),	  pp.	  230-­‐
73;	  F.	  Trentmann,	  Free	  Trade	  Nation:	  Commerce,	  Consumption,	  and	  Civil	  Society	  in	  
Modern	  Britain	  (Oxford,	  2008),	  pp.	  33-­‐133.	  
51	  C.	  Brown,	  The	  Death	  of	  Christian	  Britain:	  Understanding	  Secularisation	  1800-­‐
2000	  (London,	  2001).	  
52	  I.G.C.	  Hutchison,	  A	  Political	  History	  of	  Scotland	  1832-­‐1924:	  Parties,	  Elections	  
and	  Issues	  (Edinburgh,	  1986),	  pp.	  234-­‐245;	  J.G.	  Jones,	  ‘E.T.	  John	  and	  Welsh	  Home	  
Rule,	  1910-­‐14’,	  Welsh	  History	  Review,	  xii	  (1987),	  453-­‐87.	  
53	  I.	  Packer,	  Lloyd	  George,	  Liberalism	  and	  the	  Land:	  the	  Land	  Issue	  and	  Party	  
Politics	  in	  England,	  1906-­‐1914	  (Woodbridge,	  2001);	  P.	  Readman,	  Land	  and	  Nation	  
in	  England:	  Patriotism,	  National	  Identity,	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Land,	  1880-­‐1914	  
(Woodbridge,	  2008).	  
54	  M.	  Pugh,	  The	  March	  of	  the	  Women:	  a	  Revisionist	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Campaign	  for	  
Women’s	  Suffrage,	  1866-­‐1914	  (Oxford,	  2000).	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   This	  emphasis	  on	  continuity	  across	  the	  ‘long’	  nineteenth	  century	  has	  
reinforced	  the	  view	  that	  it	  was	  events	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War	  that	  provide	  
the	  most	  profound	  disjuncture	  in	  the	  party’s	  history	  and	  the	  most	  convincing	  
explanation	  of	  its	  downfall.	  Debates	  about	  why	  the	  war	  was	  so	  toxic	  for	  the	  
Liberals	  have	  tended	  to	  mirror	  the	  themes	  that	  have	  dominated	  analysis	  of	  the	  
party’s	  fortunes	  before	  1914.	  Older	  analyses	  saw	  the	  war	  as	  merely	  speeding	  up	  
trends	  in	  society	  and	  the	  economy	  that	  were	  already	  apparent	  from	  the	  1880s	  
onwards	  and	  that	  rapidly	  reinforced	  working	  class	  consciousness	  and	  thus	  the	  
trend	  towards	  Labour	  voting.	  As	  with	  the	  pre-­‐1914	  era,	  historians	  are	  no	  longer	  
so	  sure	  these	  trends	  can	  be	  identified.	  If	  the	  war	  helped	  Labour	  challenge	  the	  
Liberals,	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  political	  rather	  a	  social	  process	  –	  by	  allowing	  it	  to	  
serve	  in	  the	  Cabinet	  and	  stimulating	  the	  expansion	  of	  trades	  unions	  and	  their	  
political	  funds.55	  	  
	   But	  this	  allowed	  Labour	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  Liberals’	  difficulties	  
rather	  than	  ensuring	  it	  would	  displace	  them.	  	  However,	  in	  a	  final	  chronological	  
flourish	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  Liberalism	  could	  not	  cope	  with	  modernity,	  some	  
historians	  have	  been	  eager	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  Liberals	  were	  particularly	  poorly-­‐
equipped	  to	  wage	  total	  war	  because	  of	  their	  squeamish	  attachment	  to	  civil	  
liberties	  and	  hostility	  to	  increasing	  the	  State’s	  role	  in	  the	  economy.56	  The	  party	  
thus	  failed	  the	  final	  test	  of	  modernity	  –	  it	  could	  not	  organise	  the	  ‘Great	  War’.	  This	  
argument,	  though,	  has	  proved	  difficult	  to	  demonstrate,	  as	  the	  Liberals	  had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  McKibbin,	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Labour	  Party;	  A.	  Reid,	  ‘The	  Impact	  of	  the	  First	  World	  
War	  on	  British	  Workers’	  in	  R.	  Wall	  and	  J.	  Winter,	  eds,	  The	  Upheaval	  of	  War:	  
Family,	  Work	  and	  Welfare	  in	  Europe,	  1914-­‐1918	  (Cambridge,	  1988),	  pp.	  221-­‐33;	  
Tanner,	  Political	  Change	  and	  the	  Labour	  Party,	  pp.	  351-­‐83.	  
56	  T.	  Wilson,	  The	  Downfall	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Party,	  1914-­‐1935	  (London,	  1966),	  pp.	  30-­‐
5.	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proved	  willing	  to	  push	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  State	  forward	  in	  the	  area	  of	  social	  
reform	  before	  1914	  and	  accepted	  everything	  from	  State	  control	  of	  the	  
engineering	  industry	  to	  conscription	  in	  1914-­‐1916.	  The	  Liberals’	  implosion	  was	  
fundamentally	  a	  matter	  of	  high	  politics	  –	  Lloyd	  George’s	  coup,	  which	  replaced	  
Asquith	  as	  prime	  minister	  in	  December	  1916.57	  Attempts	  to	  relate	  this	  event	  to	  
divisions	  in	  the	  party	  before	  1914	  have	  proved	  unconvincing.58	  Primarily	  the	  
split	  in	  1916	  was	  as	  unforeseeable	  as	  Gladstone’s	  declaration	  for	  Home	  Rule	  in	  
1885.	  But	  unlike	  the	  crisis	  of	  1885-­‐1886	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  discern	  any	  ideological	  
rift	  between	  Asquith	  and	  Lloyd	  George.	  The	  latter	  merely	  asserted	  he	  would	  be	  a	  
more	  effective	  wartime	  prime	  minister	  than	  the	  former.	  
	   Historians	  have	  been	  reluctant	  to	  accept	  that	  personal	  power	  struggles	  
can	  determine	  grand	  political	  events,	  such	  as	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  Liberal	  party.	  But	  
by	  uncoupling	  politics	  from	  the	  determinism	  of	  explanations	  that	  centre	  on	  class	  
and	  economic	  developments,	  this	  at	  least	  becomes	  possible.	  However,	  the	  more	  
recent	  emphasis	  on	  the	  continuity	  and	  resilience	  of	  long-­‐standing	  Liberal	  
narratives	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  is	  not	  much	  more	  hospitable	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  
the	  party	  might	  be	  brought	  down	  by	  a	  squabble	  at	  the	  top.	  This	  view	  can	  be	  
meshed	  more	  neatly	  with	  the	  high	  political	  notion	  of	  the	  Liberals’	  downfall	  if	  
Lloyd	  George’s	  coup	  is	  placed	  in	  a	  wider	  context.	  	  The	  division	  of	  1916	  was	  not	  
healed	  (formally)	  until	  1923.	  This	  was	  just	  at	  the	  time	  when	  the	  voting	  system	  
underwent	  its	  greatest	  change	  under	  the	  1918	  Reform	  Act,	  which	  enfranchised	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all	  men	  over	  21	  and	  women	  over	  30,	  and	  it	  was	  crucial	  to	  recruit	  new	  voters.59	  
Moreover,	  this	  was	  a	  time	  when	  the	  Liberals	  faced	  challengers	  from	  both	  Left	  
and	  Right,	  who	  had	  been	  invigorated	  by	  the	  war.60	  But,	  just	  as	  importantly,	  the	  
great	  Liberal	  issues	  of	  the	  pre-­‐war	  period	  were	  also	  undergoing	  dramatic	  
transformations.	  Irish	  Home	  Rule	  disappeared	  once	  most	  of	  Ireland	  became	  
independent	  in	  1921.	  Free	  Trade	  was	  increasingly	  undermined	  by	  world	  
economic	  competition	  and	  changing	  ideas	  about	  how	  to	  protect	  consumers.	  Land	  
reform	  became	  less	  pressing	  as	  great	  landowners	  disappeared	  in	  the	  wholesale	  
disposal	  of	  country	  estates	  post-­‐world	  war	  one.61	  These	  narratives	  did	  not	  
disintegrate	  overnight	  (Free	  Trade	  greatly	  helped	  the	  reunited	  Liberals	  at	  the	  
1923	  general	  election),	  but	  they	  required	  the	  party’s	  attention	  and	  ingenuity	  to	  
ensure	  they	  continued	  to	  work	  on	  their	  behalf.	  A	  party	  at	  war	  with	  itself	  was	  in	  
no	  condition	  to	  act	  with	  this	  kind	  of	  dexterity.	  
	   The	  Liberals’	  difficulties	  with	  handling	  these	  longstanding	  themes	  and	  
narratives	  were	  intensified	  by	  its	  problematic	  position	  in	  the	  party	  system	  after	  
the	  1918	  general	  election.	  Once	  they	  ceased	  to	  be	  the	  main	  governing	  party,	  or	  
the	  official	  opposition,	  they	  were	  forced	  to	  define	  themselves	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  
relationship	  to	  the	  other	  two	  parties.	  After	  1918,	  Labour’s	  role	  as	  the	  main	  
opponent	  of	  the	  Conservatives	  polarised	  politics	  around	  attitudes	  to	  organised	  
labour	  and	  welfare	  payments,	  particularly	  unemployment	  benefit.	  On	  these	  
issues	  the	  Liberals	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  say	  anything	  distinctive	  as	  the	  positions	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‘for’	  and	  ‘against’	  on,	  for	  example,	  unemployment	  benefits	  were	  fully	  occupied.62	  
Both	  Labour	  and	  Conservatives	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  were	  in	  a	  prime	  position	  to	  
annex	  those	  parts	  of	  Liberalism	  they	  saw	  as	  compatible	  with	  their	  rhetorical	  
traditions.	  After	  1916	  much	  of	  pre-­‐war	  Liberalism	  and	  the	  remaining	  themes	  
that	  had	  sustained	  it	  migrated	  to	  Baldwin’s	  Conservatives	  (financial	  rectitude,	  
governing	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  whole	  nation)	  or	  to	  MacDonald’s	  Labour	  (Free	  Trade	  
and	  moderate	  social	  reform);	  and	  the	  Liberal	  party	  that	  was	  left	  increasingly	  
faced	  an	  identity	  crisis,	  if	  only	  because	  it	  was	  so	  much	  smaller	  and	  less	  successful	  
than	  its	  pre-­‐war	  predecessor.63	  
	   Historians	  have	  tended	  to	  see	  this	  situation	  as	  leaving	  the	  Liberals	  with	  
three	  choices.	  The	  first	  was	  to	  attempt	  to	  find	  a	  new	  way	  of	  appealing	  to	  the	  
electorate.	  The	  most	  plausible	  attempts	  to	  do	  this	  were	  Lloyd	  George’s	  ingenious	  
schemes	  in	  1925-­‐1929	  for	  land	  reform	  and	  his	  proposals	  to	  ‘conquer	  
unemployment’	  through	  public	  works.	  There	  has	  been	  some	  debate	  about	  how	  
convincing	  these	  ideas	  were,	  but	  unanimity	  that	  they	  failed	  to	  break	  into	  the	  
Labour	  and	  Conservative	  party’s	  rhetorical	  battle	  about	  welfare	  spending	  versus	  
lower	  taxation.64	  The	  second	  choice	  was	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  party	  had	  nothing	  left	  
to	  say	  and	  that	  its	  ideas	  and	  narratives	  primarily	  existed	  in	  other	  parties.	  This	  
was	  the	  route	  taken	  by	  half	  the	  Liberal	  MPs	  in	  1931-­‐1932,	  when	  they	  formed	  the	  
new	  Liberal	  National	  grouping	  in	  permanent	  alliance	  with	  the	  Conservatives	  and	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agreed	  that	  even	  Free	  Trade	  would	  have	  to	  be	  compromised.	  As	  Dutton	  has	  
emphasised,	  this	  further	  split	  represented	  a	  huge	  blow	  to	  the	  party’s	  viability.65	  
	   The	  third	  choice	  was	  simply	  to	  carry	  on	  and	  hope.	  Finding	  new	  policies,	  or	  
re-­‐activating	  old	  ones,	  that	  would	  increase	  the	  party’s	  appeal	  proved	  an	  
insoluble	  difficulty,	  though.	  As	  recent	  studies	  of	  Liberal	  policy	  have	  emphasised,	  
Liberals	  were	  reduced	  to	  simply	  mimicking	  appeals	  already	  fully	  embodied	  by	  
other	  parties,	  as	  with	  their	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  Beveridge	  Report	  in	  1944-­‐5,	  or	  
hostility	  to	  nationalisation	  in	  1947-­‐50;	  or	  associating	  themselves	  with	  ideas	  that	  
seemed	  impossibly	  out-­‐dated	  (Free	  Trade)	  or	  which	  nobody	  cared	  about	  (co-­‐
ownership).66	  In	  this	  situation,	  it	  seemed	  entirely	  possible	  by	  the	  early	  1950s	  
that	  the	  party	  would	  disappear	  altogether.	  	  
That	  the	  Liberal	  party	  did	  not	  vanish,	  and	  instead	  experienced	  a	  series	  of	  
limited	  revivals	  and	  contractions,	  until	  it	  merged	  with	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  in	  
1988,	  has	  been	  explained	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  	  The	  context	  for	  all	  these	  
explanations	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  related	  concepts	  of	  partisan	  de-­‐alignment	  and	  
class	  de-­‐alignment.67	  Political	  scientists	  noted,	  especially	  from	  the	  1970s	  
onwards,	  that	  the	  number	  of	  voters	  who	  identified	  strongly	  with	  either	  of	  the	  
two	  main	  political	  parties	  was	  declining,	  both	  because	  the	  electorate	  was	  
increasingly	  dissatisfied	  with	  their	  performance	  in	  office	  and	  because	  class	  was	  
becoming	  less	  clearly	  identified	  with	  voting	  behaviour.	  This	  situation	  provided	  
the	  opportunity	  for	  other	  parties	  to	  break	  into	  the	  political	  system,	  and	  that	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meant	  primarily	  the	  Liberals,	  who,	  until	  the	  1970s,	  had	  no	  competitor	  as	  a	  third	  
party	  with	  an	  existing	  structure,	  a	  presence	  in	  Parliament	  and	  some	  name	  
recognition.	  
More	  detailed	  explanations	  of	  why	  the	  Liberals	  survived,	  but	  could	  
manage	  no	  more	  than	  periodic	  revivals,	  have	  taken	  a	  number	  of	  paths.	  Some	  
historians	  have	  emphasised	  the	  central	  importance	  of	  developments	  at	  the	  level	  
of	  high	  politics,	  especially	  the	  role	  of	  a	  number	  of	  charismatic	  leaders,	  
archetypically	  Jo	  Grimond,	  in	  making	  the	  Liberals	  appear	  electable.68	  Arguably,	  
the	  arrival	  of	  a	  politics	  in	  which	  personalities	  and	  media	  image	  were	  of	  key	  
significance	  helped	  obscure	  the	  Liberals’	  continued	  difficulties	  with	  finding	  
distinctive	  and	  popular	  policies	  (by	  the	  1960s	  they	  were	  most	  associated	  with	  
membership	  of	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community	  and	  proportional	  
representation	  –	  neither	  of	  which	  mattered	  much	  to	  voters).69	  	  A	  vague	  image	  of	  
modernity	  and	  a	  willingness	  to	  embrace	  the	  use	  of	  television	  and	  advertising	  
techniques	  made	  up	  for	  some	  of	  these	  deficiencies,	  but	  may	  also	  help	  to	  explain	  
why	  Liberal	  revivals	  tended	  to	  be	  transient.	  
Other	  approaches	  to	  this	  phenomenon	  have	  concentrated	  on	  aspects	  of	  
the	  Liberals’	  identity:	  they	  have	  been	  described	  both	  as	  a	  centrist	  party,	  existing	  
ideologically	  between	  the	  two	  other	  parties,	  and	  as	  a	  party	  of	  the	  periphery,	  
strongest	  in	  the	  areas	  most	  distant	  from	  ‘modern’,	  class-­‐based	  politics.	  Both	  
positions	  offered	  a	  viable	  basis	  for	  some	  public	  support,	  but	  were	  inherently	  
unstable.	  The	  appeal	  of	  centrism	  was	  intermittent	  as	  it	  depended	  on	  perceptions	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of	  extremism	  in	  other	  parties;70	  and	  Liberalism’s	  identification	  with	  peripheral	  
areas	  could	  always	  be	  challenged,	  both	  because	  these	  identities	  were	  often	  weak	  
in	  England	  and	  because	  other	  parties	  expressed	  these	  identities	  more	  directly	  
where	  they	  were	  stronger,	  particularly	  Nationalists	  in	  rural	  Scotland	  and	  
Wales.71	  However,	  recent	  analysis	  has	  suggested	  that	  both	  definitions	  of	  
Liberalism	  post-­‐1945	  require	  heavy	  qualification.	  	  
The	  Liberals	  were	  never	  just	  a	  party	  of	  the	  periphery	  even	  at	  their	  nadir	  
in	  the	  early	  1950s,	  when	  much	  of	  their	  remaining	  strength	  in	  local	  government	  
and	  two	  of	  their	  six	  seats	  were	  in	  urban	  Lancashire	  and	  Yorkshire.	  When	  the	  
party	  began	  to	  revive,	  most	  of	  its	  new	  votes,	  if	  not	  its	  seats,	  were	  won	  in	  
suburban	  England,	  especially	  in	  the	  south-­‐east	  and	  north-­‐west.72	  These	  
phenomena	  can	  best	  be	  explained	  by	  examining	  how	  the	  Liberals	  had	  to	  function	  
in	  a	  mainly	  two-­‐party	  system.	  This	  was	  not	  as	  a	  ‘centrist’	  party	  but	  either	  as	  an	  
ally	  of,	  or	  a	  competitor	  with,	  the	  other	  parties.	  In	  the	  early-­‐mid	  1950s	  the	  
Liberals	  retained	  much	  of	  their	  residual	  presence	  by	  functioning	  as	  a	  very	  junior	  
ally	  of	  the	  Conservatives.	  But,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Liberals	  remained	  the	  main	  
opposition	  to	  the	  Conservatives	  in	  a	  few	  areas	  where	  Labour	  was	  weak,	  
especially	  some	  of	  northern	  Scotland	  and	  the	  English	  south-­‐west	  –	  they	  were	  
both	  a	  Conservative	  and	  an	  anti-­‐Conservative	  party	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  
Once	  signs	  of	  revival	  were	  apparent	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  the	  national	  party	  
rejected	  its	  local	  anti-­‐Labour	  pacts.	  	  This	  left	  the	  Liberals’	  dependent	  on	  their	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anti-­‐Conservative	  identity,	  which	  was	  most	  likely	  to	  deliver	  parliamentary	  seats	  
in	  those	  peripheral	  areas	  where	  it	  had	  best	  survived	  the	  party’s	  near-­‐extinction.	  
But	  it	  gained	  most	  of	  its	  new	  voters	  in	  suburban	  England	  as	  the	  most	  obvious	  
home	  both	  for	  disillusioned	  Conservative	  voters	  who	  could	  not	  identify	  with	  
Labour	  and	  for	  Labour	  voters	  who	  hoped	  a	  Liberal	  might	  defeat	  a	  Conservative	  
where	  a	  Labour	  candidate	  could	  not.	  	  Again,	  this	  did	  not	  necessarily	  represent	  a	  
centrist	  appeal,	  but	  a	  purely	  tactical,	  and	  very	  unstable,	  coalition.	  The	  party’s	  
identity	  was	  negative	  –	  electors	  chose	  it	  for	  what	  it	  was	  not	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  
two	  main	  parties.73	  This,	  too,	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  periodic	  nature	  of	  the	  party’s	  
revivals	  –	  it	  had	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  a	  core	  vote.	  The	  pattern	  of	  waves	  of	  Liberal	  
revival,	  followed	  by	  decline,	  established	  in	  the	  late	  1950s,	  continued	  until	  the	  
party’s	  merger	  with	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  in	  1988,	  but	  without	  resolving	  the	  
fundamental	  question	  of	  just	  what	  the	  party	  stood	  for;	  whatever	  it	  was,	  though,	  it	  
was	  only	  remotely	  related	  to	  its	  predecessor	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  and	  early-­‐
twentieth	  centuries	  
	   The	  turn	  against	  social	  factors,	  especially	  class,	  as	  the	  determinants	  of	  the	  
Liberal	  party’s	  fate	  now	  holds	  the	  field,	  but	  this	  process	  does	  present	  some	  
problems.	  Most	  importantly,	  by	  emphasising	  continuity	  over	  discontinuity,	  it	  
does	  not	  always	  make	  clear	  how	  and	  why	  Liberalism	  changed	  at	  all	  in	  this	  
period.	  However,	  the	  Liberal	  party	  did	  undergo	  a	  number	  of	  transformations	  
between	  1800	  and	  2000	  –	  most	  importantly	  in	  the	  1830s,	  the	  mid-­‐1880s	  and	  
1916-­‐24.	  All	  were	  associated	  with	  interactions	  between	  events	  in	  high	  politics	  
and	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  electoral	  system:	  in	  the	  1830s	  the	  Tory	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government	  collapsed,	  producing	  a	  Whig	  regime,	  a	  massive	  change	  to	  the	  
electoral	  system	  and	  a	  huge	  boost	  to	  political	  organisation	  and	  partisanship;	  in	  
the	  1880s	  the	  Liberal	  party	  lost	  an	  important	  segment	  of	  its	  support	  over	  Irish	  
Home	  Rule	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  electoral	  system	  acquired	  a	  clear	  working	  
class	  majority	  and	  politics	  became	  much	  more	  centred	  on	  elections	  as	  plebiscites	  
on	  the	  government,	  political	  programmes	  and	  national	  party	  organisation;	  finally	  
in	  1916-­‐24	  the	  Liberals	  split	  and	  declined	  to	  third	  party	  status	  in	  conjunction	  
with	  another	  massive	  expansion	  of	  the	  electorate	  and	  further	  changes	  to	  the	  
nature	  of	  campaigning.74	  	  
In	  turn,	  these	  events	  produced	  decisive	  changes	  in	  the	  Liberal	  party	  –	  
producing	  its	  first	  incarnation	  in	  the	  1830s,	  weakening	  it	  in	  the	  1880s	  and	  
unexpectedly	  destroying	  it	  as	  a	  major	  force	  in	  1916-­‐24.	  But	  each	  crisis	  also	  had	  
an	  important	  impact	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  political	  culture	  and	  ideas.	  In	  the	  1830s,	  by	  
entering	  government,	  the	  Whigs	  had	  to	  define	  their	  attitude	  to	  a	  host	  of	  pressing	  
political	  matters	  on	  which	  their	  views	  were	  not	  clear	  at	  all	  before	  1830,	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  Poor	  Law	  reform.	  Their	  own	  legislation	  led	  them	  to	  enact	  reforms	  that	  
had	  not	  been	  central	  to	  their	  identity	  in	  opposition,	  as	  with	  municipal	  reform,	  
and	  their	  attempt	  to	  govern	  in	  a	  balanced	  and	  disinterested	  fashion	  produced	  
interventions	  in	  society	  that	  had	  not	  been	  foreseen,	  as	  with	  the	  Factory	  Act	  
(1833),	  and	  to	  take	  up	  new	  positions	  on	  the	  corn	  laws,	  electoral	  reforms	  like	  the	  
secret	  ballot	  and	  the	  removal	  of	  religious	  disabilities.	  Similarly,	  after	  1885	  the	  
Liberal	  party’s	  official	  ideology	  became	  much	  more	  radical	  and	  programmatic,	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not	  just	  on	  Home	  Rule,	  but	  on	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  issues	  from	  land	  reform	  to	  
temperance,	  once	  many	  moderates	  defected.	  Finally,	  in	  1916-­‐24	  the	  party’s	  
position	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  politics	  imploded	  and	  as	  a	  third	  party	  it	  found	  it	  
increasingly	  difficult	  to	  retain	  ownership	  of	  key	  themes	  in	  its	  identity	  and	  to	  
effectively	  manipulate	  those	  with	  which	  it	  was	  still	  identified	  in	  a	  new	  political	  
environment.75	  
None	  of	  these	  developments	  suggest	  that	  there	  were	  not	  underlying	  
continuities	  in	  Liberal	  mentalities	  across	  these	  periods.	  However,	  re-­‐
emphasising	  these	  disjunctures	  based	  on	  the	  interaction	  between	  high	  politics	  
and	  political	  structures	  provides	  an	  explanatory	  mechanism	  for	  how	  Liberalism	  
itself	  could	  change	  rapidly.	  This	  methodology	  also	  suggests	  where	  further	  
research	  is	  urgently	  needed.	  While	  developments	  in	  the	  1830s	  and	  1880s	  have	  
been	  examined	  at	  length,	  much	  less	  has	  been	  written	  about	  the	  Liberal	  party	  in	  
1916-­‐24,	  even	  though,	  if	  the	  party	  was	  performing	  well	  in	  1914,	  as	  current	  
research	  indicates,	  this	  was	  the	  crucial	  moment	  in	  the	  party’s	  decline.	  In	  
particular,	  intensive	  study	  of	  how	  Liberalism	  reacted	  to	  and	  positioned	  itself	  
with	  regard	  to	  other	  parties	  and	  ideologies	  would	  shed	  much-­‐needed	  light	  on	  its	  
difficulties	  in	  recovering	  from	  the	  disasters	  of	  1916-­‐1918.	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  current	  emphasis	  on	  political	  culture	  and	  
language	  is	  played	  out.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  areas	  where	  this	  process	  is	  still	  in	  
its	  infancy.	  For	  instance,	  the	  importance	  of	  concepts	  of	  masculinity	  has	  been	  
strongly	  emphasised	  in	  relation	  to	  debates	  about	  the	  1867	  Reform	  Act,	  both	  in	  
justifying	  who	  might	  be	  enfranchised	  -­‐	  working	  men	  who	  displayed	  ‘manly	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independence’	  -­‐	  and	  who	  was	  excluded.76	  But	  the	  significance	  of	  these	  concepts	  
in	  subsequent	  Liberal	  discourses	  (other	  than	  female	  suffrage)	  has	  received	  very	  
little	  attention.	  Yet	  its	  implications	  were	  wide-­‐ranging	  in	  areas	  as	  diverse	  as	  Irish	  
Home	  Rule,	  which	  could	  be	  presented	  as	  a	  recognition	  that	  the	  Irish	  had	  
achieved	  a	  ‘manly’	  self-­‐control	  and	  deserved	  self-­‐government,	  to	  Edwardian	  
social	  reform,	  which	  had	  to	  be	  carefully	  presented	  as	  not	  infringing	  on	  masculine	  
independence	  	  -­‐	  especially	  at	  a	  time	  when	  women’s	  right	  to	  enter	  the	  male	  public	  
sphere	  was	  supported	  by	  many	  Liberals.	  	  
There	  are	  also	  a	  number	  of	  fields	  in	  which	  Liberal	  discourse	  has	  been	  
much	  more	  fully	  explored,	  but	  only	  within	  limited	  chronological	  boundaries.	  This	  
is	  most	  notable	  in	  the	  case	  of	  patriotism,	  which	  Parry	  has	  examined	  in	  detail,	  but	  
only	  as	  far	  as	  1886.77	  Yet	  patriotism	  was	  a	  deeply	  contested	  feature	  of	  the	  
Liberals’	  identity	  in	  the	  years	  down	  to	  1914.	  The	  Liberal	  Imperialist	  and	  Radical	  
strands	  within	  the	  party	  espoused	  very	  different	  views	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  but	  how	  
these	  were	  justified	  and	  related	  to	  both	  Liberalism	  and	  patriotism	  remains	  to	  be	  
examined	  –	  the	  most	  recent	  major	  studies	  of	  Liberal	  Imperialism	  and	  Radicalism	  
date	  back	  to	  the	  early	  1970s.78	  The	  same	  might	  be	  said	  of	  Liberalism’s	  
relationship	  with	  other	  systems	  of	  thought	  in	  society,	  especially	  religion.	  A	  great	  
deal	  has	  been	  written	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  Nonconformity	  to	  Liberal	  
electoral	  support,	  the	  centrality	  of	  religious	  controversies	  to	  Liberal	  legislation	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and	  of	  personal	  religion	  to	  the	  motivations	  of	  key	  figures,	  especially	  Gladstone.79	  
But	  the	  study	  of	  theology	  and	  its	  inter-­‐relationship	  with	  Liberalism	  stops	  short	  in	  
the	  1860s	  and	  1870s,	  although	  it	  is	  as	  least	  arguable	  that	  many	  developments	  in	  
Liberal	  policy	  and	  discourse,	  from	  temperance	  to	  social	  reform,	  were	  deeply	  
involved	  with	  developments	  in	  theology,	  especially	  in	  the	  Nonconformist	  
churches.80	  
The	  study	  of	  Liberalism’s	  political	  culture	  and	  discourse	  can	  also	  be	  
pushed	  forward	  by	  new	  methodologies.	  Now	  that	  parliamentary	  debates	  and	  
newspaper	  reports	  of	  politicians’	  speeches	  are	  increasingly	  available	  in	  digital	  
form	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  undertake	  large-­‐scale	  text	  mining	  of	  this	  material.	  This	  
process	  is	  only	  just	  beginning,	  but	  it	  will	  make	  possible	  quantitative	  as	  well	  as	  
qualitative	  analyses	  of	  the	  content	  of	  political	  language.	  In	  turn,	  this	  will	  provide	  
new	  ways	  of	  testing	  current	  ideas	  about	  the	  continuity	  of	  Liberal	  discourse	  
across	  the	  long	  nineteenth	  century,	  and	  identifying	  how	  and	  when	  the	  content	  of	  
Liberals’	  political	  language	  changed.	  This	  will	  be	  particularly	  important	  for	  
analysing	  key	  turning	  points,	  such	  as	  the	  crises	  of	  the	  1880s	  and	  1916-­‐24,	  and	  
the	  Liberal	  message	  and	  image	  at	  general	  elections	  and	  over	  key	  pieces	  of	  
legislation.81	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In	  turn,	  this	  process	  will	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  recover	  the	  public	  language	  
of	  Liberal	  MPs	  –	  a	  key	  step	  in	  increasing	  knowledge	  of	  this	  group,	  about	  whose	  
overall	  characteristics	  and	  views	  much	  still	  remains	  to	  be	  discovered.	  Historians	  
have	  called	  insistently	  for	  high	  and	  low	  politics	  to	  be	  joined	  up;	  and	  MPs	  
represent	  the	  missing	  middle	  in	  this	  relationship,	  conveying	  local	  concerns	  to	  the	  
party	  leadership	  and	  the	  leaders’	  message	  to	  activists	  and	  localities.82	  A	  wide-­‐
ranging	  analysis	  of	  what	  they	  said	  in	  Parliament	  and	  their	  constituencies	  is	  one	  
way	  to	  reach	  a	  much	  surer	  identification	  of	  how	  the	  concerns	  and	  language	  of	  
high	  and	  low	  politics	  interconnected	  and	  developed.	  
Finally,	  big	  data	  will	  not	  only	  allow	  more	  insight	  into	  the	  language	  used	  by	  
MPs,	  it	  will	  make	  available	  much	  more	  material	  for	  prosopographical	  studies	  of	  
this	  group,	  and	  thus	  help	  recover	  the	  social	  context	  of	  Liberalism	  at	  this	  crucial	  
intermediary	  level.	  Liberalism	  was	  not	  just	  a	  set	  of	  discourses,	  it	  was	  also	  a	  lived	  
social	  reality	  for	  its	  exponents	  and	  existed	  at	  the	  level	  of	  familial	  and	  friendship	  
networks,	  club	  and	  pressure	  group	  memberships,	  church	  affiliations,	  charitable	  
endeavours	  and	  business	  relationships.	  Liberals’	  political	  language	  existed	  
within	  this	  context	  and	  recovering	  the	  interrelationships	  and	  extra-­‐
parliamentary	  identities	  of	  Liberal	  MPs	  will	  help	  understand	  how	  this	  language	  
was	  connected	  to	  Liberals’	  actions	  and	  activities.	  It	  is	  even	  beginning	  to	  be	  
possible	  to	  discover	  something	  of	  the	  social	  context	  of	  Liberal	  constituency	  
activists,	  by	  matching	  up	  local	  party	  records	  with	  census	  data	  and	  other	  local	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material.83	  As	  digitisation	  gathers	  pace,	  this	  body	  of	  work	  will	  grow	  and	  it	  will	  be	  
possible	  to	  reach	  firmer	  conclusions	  about	  the	  social	  profile	  of	  the	  party	  
membership	  and	  some	  of	  the	  key	  aspects	  of	  their	  identity,	  such	  as	  religious	  
affiliation.	  Taken	  together,	  all	  these	  developments	  provide	  the	  opportunity	  of	  
answering	  questions	  about	  both	  what	  Liberalism	  was	  understood	  to	  be	  and	  who	  
found	  the	  creed	  attractive.	  
There	  are,	  therefore,	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  current	  emphasis	  on	  
political	  culture	  and	  language	  in	  the	  study	  of	  Liberalism	  can	  be	  developed	  and	  
pushed	  forward.	  Some	  of	  these	  will	  undoubtedly	  shed	  further	  light	  on	  the	  
question	  of	  the	  Liberals’	  decline,	  especially	  by	  examining	  the	  key	  period	  of	  1916-­‐
24.	  But	  they	  also	  offer	  the	  real	  possibility	  of	  finally	  putting	  that	  debate	  into	  the	  
much	  wider	  context	  of	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Liberal	  party	  and	  its	  
actions.	  The	  party’s	  decline	  will	  always	  be	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  its	  history;	  but	  the	  
Liberal	  party	  was	  the	  dominant	  political	  force	  in	  Britain	  for	  nearly	  a	  century	  and	  
there	  is	  much	  more	  to	  say	  about	  it	  than	  that	  it	  ceased	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  political	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